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Abstract
In this paper, we use the Demographic and Health Survey conducted in Mali to compare
children in polygynous families and their counterparts in monogamous families. We also
analyse the link between the mothers' order of marriage and their children's outcomes. We
ﬁnally propose a theoretical model to rationalise our ﬁndings. Our results show that children
in polygynous families are less enrolled in school, progress less at school and do less domestic
household work compared to children from monogamous families. For polygynous families,
we found that educational enrolment and progress of children of the ﬁrst wife are higher than
that of children of the second and subsequent wives. Moreover, weight-for-height and body
mass index are both lower for children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of second and
subsequent wives. Children of ﬁrst wives work more at home compared to children of second
and subsequent wives. Our theoretical model predicts that if fathers discriminate against
their ﬁrst wives and if eﬀort at school is positively correlated to the father's discrimination,
then, on average, children of ﬁrst wives will perform better at school but will consume less
and will have a lower health outcomes compared to children of second wives.
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1 Introduction
Polygyny is a family structure in which men have multiple wives. It is legally practised in about 850
societies around the world (Hartung et al., 1982; Elbedour et al., 2002). However, little research in
the economic literature has focused on the link between polygyny and children's outcomes. To our
knowledge, no economic research has addressed the links between wives order in polygynous families
and their children's outcomes. An economic analysis is necessary to understand the possible
channels that drive the results and to provide policy recommendations.
The consequences of polygyny on children have been mostly discussed in the psychology and
anthropology literature, usually with few observations (Strassmann, 1997; Sellen, 1999; Gibson
& Mace, 2007; Omariba & Boyle, 2007; Lawson & Uggla, 2014; Strassmann, 2017; Uggla et al.,
2017). Even in the psychology and anthropology literature, however, only a few studies have
explored whether the eﬀect of polygyny on children's outcomes depends on the mother's marriage
order.
The eﬀect of polygyny on children may strongly depends on the country studied. As pointed
out by Elbedour et al. (2002), the function polygyny serves and the values the society attaches to
polygyny determine the impact of polygyny on children. The cultural context and diﬀerences in
cultural groups within a speciﬁc country may have an impact on the link between polygyny and
children's outcomes. In Mali, approximately 40 percent of married women are in a polygynous
union (Tertilt, 2005). To our knowledge, no studies have explored whether polygyny aﬀects chil-
dren's education and health or child labour in Mali. In particular, no study has focused on the
link between a wife's marriage order and her children's outcomes in that country.
In this paper, we use the most recent Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in
Mali in 2012-2013 to assess the link between polygyny and children's outcomes. We also analyse
the link between the mother's order of marriage and her children's outcomes. Our focus is on three
important dimensions of child outcomes: education, health and child labor. We use two indicat-
ors to measure child education outcomes: school enrollment and schooling-for-age (SAGE). We
measure children's health status by weight-for-height and body mass index (BMI). We ﬁnally use
three indicators to measure child labor: domestic household work status, work for family members
status and work status outside the household. We also propose a theoretical and structural model
to understand the possible mechanisms that drive our results.
Our empirical analysis shows that children in polygynous families are less likely to be enrolled
in and to progress at school compared to their counterparts in monogamous families. Surprisingly,
children in polygynous families also do less domestic household work compared to children from
monogamous families. We also found that educational enrolment and progress are higher for
children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of second and subsequent wives. However, weight-
for-height and BMI are both lower for children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of second
and subsequent wives. Additionally, children of ﬁrst wives do more household work compared
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to children of second and subsequent wives. In terms of time working outside the household,
we found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between children of ﬁrst wives and children of second and
subsequent wives.
Our proposed model predicts that if the father discriminates against the ﬁrst wife and if chil-
dren's eﬀorts at school are positively correlated to negative discrimination, then, on average,
children of ﬁrst wives will have better performance at school but will consume less and will have
a lower health index compared to children of second wives. Understanding the discrepancies in
children's outcomes and the possible channels that drive those results are relevant for policymakers
when trying to provide solutions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the psychology
and anthropology literature that partly helps to build the intuition of our theoretical model.
Section 3 presents the data used in our analysis. The empirical strategy is presented in section 4.
In section 5, we present the results of our comparison of polygyny and monogamy. Results from
children's outcome diﬀerences related to the mother's order of marriage are presented in section
6. Section 7 provides a discussion of our empirical results. The structural model is presented in
section 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 Polygyny and Children's Outcomes: A Brief Review
2.1 Why Polygyny ?
One factor that may encourage a preference for polygyny is the number of children, especially
in regions with a high mortality rate (Elbedour et al., 2002). In his study concerning Ghana,
Klomegah (1997) observed that having many children contributes to the economic prosperity of
the whole family.
Religion is also correlated to the choice of polygyny. Peterson (1999) and Klomegah (1997)
observe in Niger and in Ghana, respectively, that Muslim individuals are more likely to prefer a
polygynous family structure than adherents of other religions.
Education can also be associated with polygyny, but the eﬀect strongly depends on gender and
on the country chosen for analysis (Elbedour et al., 2002). Al-Krenawi (2001) and Peterson (1999)
found no relationship between wives' education and their membership in polygynous families in
Bedouin-Arab communities in Israel and in Niger, respectively. In contrast, Klomegah (1997)
observed in Ghana that less-educated wives tend to be associated with polygynous families. Al-
Krenawi & Lightman (2000) showed in a Bedouin-Arab community in Israel that the level of
education of fathers in polygynous families was lower than that of fathers in monogamous families.
Gage-Brandon (1992) also observed a similar result for fathers in Nigeria.
It is less likely for wives in polygynous families to work outside the household. In Ghana,
Agadjanian & Ezeh (2000) found that the number of wives in polygynous families who work
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outside the house is lower than that of monogamous families. In Bedouin-Arab communities, Al-
Krenawi & Lightman (2000) found that almost no wives from polygynous families work outside
the household.
2.2 Polygyny, Risk Factors and Children's Outcomes
Many risk factors can aﬀect child outcomes in polygynous families. For example, children in
polygynous families are more likely to witness conﬂicts and jealousy compared to children in
monogamous families (Al-Krenawi, 1998; Elbedour et al., 2007). Those conﬂicts and jealousy can
have a very negative impact on children's school achievements (Emery & O'Leary, 1982; Katz &
Gottman, 1991) and aggression (Rutter, 1975; Cummings et al., 1984).
It is important to note that unhappiness of women in polygynous families may also have a
negative impact on children. First wives (senior wives) are in general unhappier than second and
subsequent wives. Using data from Ethiopia, Gibson & Mace (2007) found that the success of poly-
gynously married women depends on their order of marriage. Husbands often discriminate against
senior wives in terms of aﬀection and redistribution of income inside the household. Discrimination
among wives and children can lead to huge inequalities in children's outcomes. Discrimination can
be explained by the age of senior wives compared to second and subsequent wives: Younger wives
may be viewed by the husband as more attractive (Chrisler & Ghiz, 1993; Hurd, 2000). Discrim-
ination usually manifests as a lack of aﬀection and lower transfer of income for senior wives and
their children. In many polygynous families, the father leaves his senior wife and her children.
Paternal absence can lead to poor academic outcomes (Hetherington & Stanley-Hagan, 1986) and
issues associated with income.
Polygynous families generally produce more children. Furthermore, women in polygynous
families are less likely to work outside the home. It is therefore not surprising that the average
income per person in polygynous families is less than that in monogamous families. Low income
is usually associated with unhappiness, low education for children (Conger et al., 1997; Duncan
et al., 1998), parental intolerance (Elder Jr et al., 1995; Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 2000), health
problems in children (Bradley et al., 1994; Hanson et al., 1996; Seccombe, 2000) and depression in
children (Takeuchi et al., 1991).
3 Data
We use the 2012-2013 DHS conducted in Mali. The DHS is a national representative household
survey that provides information on population, education, health and nutrition. About 30,000
households are surveyed. The DHS database contains information on household characteristics,
such as marital status, the number of wives and the order of marriage of each wife in the household.
The DHS database also contains information on children's characteristics, such as age, gender,
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level of schooling and school attendance, and information on parental characteristics, such as age,
education, ethnicity and religion. Our analysis focuses on children aged 0-14.
For education, we use children's enrolment at school as an indicator. We also use the SAGE
of Psacharopoulos & Yang (1991) to measure progress at school. The indicator normalises the
year of schooling by the diﬀerence between the child's age and the normal schooling entry age. In
Mali, the normal schooling entry age is 6. As an example, under normal progression, a 9-year-old
child will have 3 years of schooling; in that case, the indicator will be 100. An indicator below 100
indicates low progression. The indicator captures children who have repeated their class and those
who enter school late.1 The smaller the SAGE indicator, the lower the progression of the student
at school.
Progression=SAGE =
Years of schooling
Age-6
× 100 (1)
For child health, we use the ratio of weight and height (weight-for-height) and the BMI, the
ratio of weight in kilograms and height in metres squared, of each child.
We use three indicators to measure child labour. The ﬁrst indicates whether the child performed
domestic household work. The second indicates whether the child worked for a family member,
and the third indicator provides information on whether the child worked for someone outside the
household.
The controls used in the regressions with DHS data from Mali are the sex of the head of the
family, the number of children in the family, the location of the household, the age of the child,
the age squared of the child, the sex of the child, the age of the mother, the mother's education,
the father's education, the religion of the family and the ethnicity group of the family.
Table 1 compares family and child characteristics of diﬀerent types of families: monogamous,
polygynous ﬁrst wife and polygynous second and subsequent wives. Monogamous families have a
lower average number of children and are younger and more educated than polygamous families.
They are also more likely to live in Bamako.
Table 2 reports a summary of descriptive statistics for all dependent variables with respect
to diﬀerent types of families. Children in monogamous families are more likely to be enrolled in
school and have normal academic progress compared to children in polygamous families. Children
raised in monogamous families and children of ﬁrst wives from polygynous families work more
than children of second and subsequent wives, regardless of the type of work. The table also
shows that children of ﬁrst wives from polygamous families are in worse health than children from
monogamous families and children of second and subsequent wives.
1The same indicator is also used in Ballón et al. (2018).
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4 Empirical Strategy
We estimate two diﬀerent models. In equation (2), we compare children in monogamous families
with those in polygynous families. For child education, health and labour indicators, we estimate
the following linear model:
Yi = α + β1Polygynyi + β2Xi + εi, (2)
where Yi represents the outcome considered for child i . The term Polygynyi is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if child i belongs to a polygynous family and 0 otherwise. The term Xi is a
vector of socio-economic control variables, and εi is an error term.
If β1 is statistically signiﬁcant, children who are part of a polygynous family diﬀer from children
in monogamous families for the measure studied.
For polygynous families, we also estimate equation (3), where we measure the diﬀerence, in
terms of children's outcomes, between children of ﬁrst wives and children of second and subsequent
wives. For education, health and child labour indicators, we estimate the following linear model:
Yi = α + βRWiveOrderi + βXXi + ηi (3)
where Yi still represents the outcome indicator for child i. The term WiveOrderi takes the value
of 0 if child i was born in a monogamous family, 1 if i is a child of the ﬁrst wife in a polygynous
family and 2 if i is a child of a second or subsequent wife. Xi is a vector of socio-economic control
variables, and ηi is an error term.
If βR is statistically signiﬁcant, then children from the wife of the rank considered diﬀer from
children in monogamous families for the measure studied.
All statistical analyses are weighted using sample weights provided by the DHS.
Results comparing children from polygynous families with their counterparts from monogamous
families are presented in section 5. Section 6 analyses the diﬀerences between children related to
their mother's order of marriage in polygynous families.
5 Result 1: Polygyny versus Monogamy
5.1 Children's Education and Polygyny
Table 3 presents the estimates of equation 2 when the variables of interest are the child's enrolment
(column I and II) and progression in school (column III and IV), with and without the control
variables.
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5.1.1 Children's Enrolment and Polygyny
Column (I) of table 3 shows that being a child in a polygynous family reduces the likelihood of
being enrolled in school by 8.8 percentage points compared to children in monogamous families.
Column (II) of table 3 controls for child and parental characteristics. Interestingly, our conclusion
is not altered.
In addition, for male children, the likelihood of being enrolled in school is 4.6 percentage points
higher compared to that of female children. We also ﬁnd that having a man as head of the family
reduces the likelihood of children being enrolled in school by 5.8 percentage points. Column (II)
of table 3 shows that when the household is in Bamako, the probability of children being enrolled
in school increases by 26 percentage points. Education of the parents also has a positive impact
on school enrolment. As shown in column (II) of table 3, each additional year of schooling for
mothers increases the likelihood of children being enrolled by 1.5 percentage points, and each
additional year of schooling for fathers increases the likelihood by 2.7 percentage points. Being
Muslim decreases the likelihood of children being enrolled by 5.5 percentage points in comparison
to other religious aﬃliations. Finally, being in a speciﬁc ethnic group may also have an impact on
school enrolment for children. Column (II) of table 3 shows that being part of the Bambara ethnic
group increases the likelihood of being enrolled by 4.5 percentage points.
5.1.2 Children's Progression in School and Polygyny
Column (III) of table 3 shows that being a child in a polygynous family reduces the education
progression indicator by 10.6 units compared to children in monogamous families. Column (IV) of
table 3 controls for other socio-economic variables. Our conclusion is not altered.
Column (IV) also reports that being male increases the progression indicator for children by
3.2, but having a man as head of the family reduces the progression indicator by 7.7. Column (IV)
of table 3 shows that having a house located in Bamako increases the progression indicator for
children by 28 in comparison to school enrolment when the house is located outside of Bamako.
Education of the parents also has a positive impact on progression at school. As shown in column
(IV) of table 3, each additional year of schooling for mothers increases the progression indicator of
children by 1.9, and each additional year of schooling for fathers increases the progression indicator
by 3.9. Being aﬃliated with the Muslim faith decreases the progression indicator for children by
7.6. Finally, being in a speciﬁc ethnic group does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the progression
indicator for children.
5.2 Children's Health and Polygynous Families
To compare the health of children from polygynous families to that of children from monogamous
families, we use weight-for-height and BMI, or weight-for-squared-height. Table 4 shows that in
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terms of weight, children in polygynous families do not diﬀer from those in monogamous families.
We also found that the number of children in the family has an impact on weight-for-height and
BMI; an additional child increases both indicators by 2.2 and 2.5, respectively.
5.3 Child Labour and Polygynous Families
Table 5 presents the estimates of model 2 when the variable of interest is children's labour.
5.3.1 Child Works in the Domestic Household
Column (II) of table 5 presents the results obtained after controlling for household, child and parent
characteristics. Being a child in a polygynous family reduces the likelihood of doing domestic
household work by 2.3 percentage points compared to that of a child in a monogamous family.
The reason may be that there is less household work to do when there are many people at home.
Column II shows that an additional child in the family reduces the likelihood of doing domestic
household work by 0.5 percentage points. Moreover, being male reduces the likelihood of doing
domestic household work by 20.9 percentage points. Finally, parents' education also has a positive
impact on reducing children's domestic household work: An additional year of schooling for fathers
reduces the likelihood of children doing domestic household work by 0.9 percentage points.
5.3.2 Child Works for Another Family Member
Column (IV) of table 5 presents the results obtained regarding work done for a family member,
after controlling for other characteristics. Being a child in a polygynous family does not have any
impact on the likelihood of working for another family member compared to that of a child from
a monogamous family.
As shown in column (IV), one additional year of schooling for parents reduced the likelihood
of the child working for another family member by approximately 0.5 percentage points. Column
(IV) of table 5 shows that being part of the Bambara ethnic group increases the likelihood of
working for another family member by 1.7 percentage points compared to that of other ethnic
groups.
5.3.3 Children Work for Someone Outside the Household
Column (VI) of table 5 presents the results obtained for work done by children for someone outside
the household, after controlling for other characteristics. As shown, being a child in a polygynous
family does not have any impact on the likelihood of working for someone outside the household
compared to results obtained for children from monogamous families.
However, the location of the household and the ethnic group of the family play a signiﬁcant role.
Being located in the big city of Bamako reduces the likelihood of children working for someone
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outside the household by 2.3 percentage points compared to that of other cities and villages.
Column (IV) also shows that being part of the Bambara ethnic group increases the likelihood of
working for someone outside the household by 2.2 percentage points compared to that of other
ethnic groups.
6 Result 2 : Mother's Order of Marriage and Children's Out-
comes
6.1 Children's Enrolment, Children's Progression and Their Mother's
Order of Marriage
Table 6 presents the estimates of equation 3 when the variables of interest are children's enrolment
(column I and II) and progression in school (column III and IV).
6.1.1 Children's Enrolment and Their Mother's Order of Marriage
Column (I) of table 6 shows that being a child of the ﬁrst wife in a polygynous family reduces the
likelihood of being enrolled in school by 8 percentage points compared to that of children from
monogamous families. The reduction is 9.8 percentage points for children of second wives. We
also observed that the reduction is greater for children of second and subsequent wives compared
to those of ﬁrst wives in polygynous families.
Column (II) of table 6 controls for other household, child and parent characteristics. We still
observe a similar result: The reduction is 2.6 percentage points in the case of the ﬁrst wife and 3.6
percentage points in the case of the second or subsequent wife.
6.1.2 Children's Progression in School and Their Mother's Order of Marriage
Column (III) of table 6 shows that being a child of the ﬁrst wife in a polygynous family reduces
school progression by 9.5 units compared to that of a child from a monogamous family. The
reduction is 11.8 units for children of second and subsequent wives. The reduction is thus greater
for children of second and subsequent wives compared to those of the ﬁrst wife in polygynous
families.
Column (IV) of table 6 controls for other household, child and parent characteristics. We
obtain a similar result. After controlling for other characteristics, the reduction decreases to 2.7
units in the case of the ﬁrst wife and to 5.7 units in the case of the second and subsequent wives.
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6.2 Weight-for-height, BMI and Mother's Order of Marriage
Table 7 presents the estimates of equation 3 when the variables of interest are weight-for-height
and BMI.
Column (II) of table 7 presents our statistics after controlling for other characteristics. We
ﬁnd that being a child of the ﬁrst wife in a polygynous family reduces the weight-for-height
indicator by 12.7 units compared to that of a child in a monogamous family. The coeﬃcient is
not signiﬁcant for children of second and subsequent wives compared to children in monogamous
families. The reduction is thus greater for children of the ﬁrst wife compared to those of the second
and subsequent wives.
Column (IV) of table 7 conﬁrms the previous ﬁndings when we use the BMI indicator. After
controlling for other characteristics, our result shows that being a child of the ﬁrst wife in a
polygynous family reduces the BMI by 13 units compared to that of a child in a monogamous
family. Once again, the reduction is not signiﬁcant for children of second and subsequent wives
compared to children in monogamous families. The reduction in BMI is therefore greater for
children of ﬁrst wives compared to those of second and subsequent wives.
6.3 Children's Labour and Their Mother's Order of Marriage
Table 8 presents the estimates of equation 3 when the variable of interest is children's labour.
6.3.1 Children's Work in the Domestic Household and Their Mother's Order of
Marriage
Column (I) of table 8 shows that being a child of the second and subsequent wives reduces the
likelihood of working in the domestic household by 2.7 percentage points compared to that of
children in monogamous families. The coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant for children of ﬁrst
wives compared to that of children in monogamous families. The reduction is greater for children
of second and subsequent wives compared to those of ﬁrst wives.
Column (II) of table 8 presents the outcomes of interest after controlling for other characterist-
ics. Our results remain similar. Indeed, being a child of second and subsequent wives now reduces
the likelihood of working in the domestic household by 3.2 percentage points compared to that of
children in monogamous families. The coeﬃcient is still not signiﬁcant for children of ﬁrst wives
compared to that of children in monogamous families. The reduction remains greater for children
of the second and subsequent wives compared to those of the ﬁrst wife in polygynous families.
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6.3.2 Children's Work for Another Family Member and Their Mother's Order of
Marriage
Column (III) of table 8 shows that being a child of a ﬁrst wife in a polygynous family increases
the likelihood of working for another family member by 5.4 percentage points compared to that
of children in monogamous families. The change in the likelihood is not statistically signiﬁcant
for children of second and subsequent wives compared to that of children in monogamous families.
The increases are greater for children of ﬁrst wives than for children of second and subsequent
wives.
Column (IV) shows that being a child of the ﬁrst wife in a polygynous family now increases
the likelihood of working for another family member by 2.7 percentage points compared to that
of children in monogamous families. The change remains statistically nonsigniﬁcant for children
of the second and subsequent wives compared to that of children in monogamous families. After
controlling for other characteristics, the increase in the likelihood of working for another fam-
ily member remains greater for children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of the second and
subsequent wives.
6.3.3 Children's Work for Someone Outside the Household and Their Mother's Order
of Marriage
Column (V) of table 8 shows that being a child of the second and subsequent wives reduces the
likelihood of working for someone outside the household by 1.3 percentage points compared to that
of children in monogamous families. The change in the likelihood is not statistically signiﬁcant
for children of the ﬁrst wife compared to that of children in monogamous families. The decrease
is greater for children of second and subsequent wives compared to the decreases observed for
children of the ﬁrst wife in polygynous families.
Column (VI) of table 8 presents the results after controlling for other characteristics. The
diﬀerence is no longer statistically signiﬁcant even if the statistic still displays a greater reduction
of work outside the household for children of second and subsequent wives compared to children
of ﬁrst wives.
7 Summary and Discussion
Our ﬁrst analysis concerning diﬀerences between polygynous and monogamous families provides
evidence that children in polygynous families are enrolled in school less often and progress less at
school compared to children from monogamous families. For health measures, there are no signiﬁc-
ant diﬀerences between children in polygynous families and children in monogamous families. Our
results also indicate that children from polygynous families do less household work than children
in monogamous families; this speciﬁc result may be due to the larger number of children reducing
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the average household work. There is no diﬀerence between polygyny and monogamy in terms of
working for another family member or working for someone outside the household.
The lower performance in education for polygynous families can be explained by their lower
average income compared to that in monogamous families (Conger et al., 1997; Duncan et al.,
1998). Because polygynous families generally contain more women and more children, the average
income is lower. Education of children, especially women's education, becomes less of a priority
than some other important issues, such as health (Omariba & Boyle, 2007; Tenikue & Verheyden,
2010). Many families may have diﬃculties in buying essential school supplies for their children.
The lack of diﬀerences between polygynous and monogamous families in terms of health may be
due to the priority that families give to health.
In our second econometric analysis regarding the link between the order of marriage of mothers
and their children's outcomes, we report that the school enrolment and progression of children of
ﬁrst wives are greater than that of children of the second and subsequent wives. Health indicators,
however, are lower for children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of second and subsequent
wives. Additionally, children of ﬁrst wives work more at home compared to children of second and
subsequent wives. We found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between children of the ﬁrst wife and those
of the second and subsequent wives in terms of time working outside the household.
The fact the children of ﬁrst (senior) wives perform better in school could be related to their
experience advantage compared to children of second and subsequent wives. That experience ad-
vantage may lead ﬁrst wives to prioritise the education of their children. Note that second and
subsequent wives are usually younger than their husband. That age disparity may lead to a gender
hierarchy, with the man being more experienced than the woman. Being close, in an emotional
sense, to their husband in general may cause women to have less interest in their children's educa-
tion, leading second and subsequent wives to neglect the education of their children. Moreover, the
negative discrimination faced by the ﬁrst wife may lead her to prioritise the future of her children
through their education.
The lower health indicators for children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of second and
subsequent wives can be explained by discrimination against the ﬁrst (senior) wife and her children
when the father redistributes the aggregate income of the family. Low income is usually associated
with health issues (Sachs & McArthur, 2005). It is well known that ﬁrst wives usually face
discrimination in polygynous families, in part because they are older than second and subsequent
wives (Chrisler & Ghiz, 1993; Hurd, 2000). The same discrimination can also explain the fact that
children of ﬁrst wives work more at home compared to other children.
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8 The model
To rationalise our ﬁndings, we propose a polygyny model that helps to understand the possible
channels that drive our results.2 For simplicity, our environment is a representative polygynous
family with two wives, one husband and children from both wives. Because we are not assessing
the impact of the number of children per wife, we will assume that both wives have the same
number of children, normalised to one.
The representative husband is endowed with exogenous income and uses it to pay for services
from his wives. Such income, for example, may represent a cash transfer from the government.
The husband then maximises his utility function by choosing remunerated services from each of
his wives, subject to his budget constraint. Additional to the exogenous income, the husband has
the responsibility of redistributing goods produced at home by his children.
Both wives gain their income from services provided to their husband. Each wife then maximises
her utility function by choosing the consumption and the home production of her children, subject
to the budget constraint.
8.1 The Problem of the Husband
The representative husband maximises his utility function by choosing the number of services
provided by each of his two wives, subject to his budget constraints. The representative husband
is endowed with an exogenous income (y) and manages the household production of his children.
This follows the idea that housework done by children contributes to the economic prosperity of
the family, 3 and children's production at home is managed by the father for the beneﬁt of the
whole family, regardless of who produces it (Klomegah, 1997). The problem of the representative
husband is presented as:
max
Sw1,Sw2
Sγw1S
1−γ
w2
subject to the constraint:
psSw1 + psSw2 = y + ρ(l1 + l2),
where Sw1 is the number of services from the ﬁrst wife; Sw2 is the number of services from the
second wife; and γ ∈ (0 1), is a parameter that describes the weight that the husband associates
2Using simple models helps to avoid numerical methods (see for example Mao Takongmo, 2017), and preserves
the understanding of the main channels and intuitions that drive the results.
3The household production of any child serves the whole family, including step-brothers and step-sisters.
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with services provided by the ﬁrst (senior) wife in his utility function. γ is less than 1
2
if the
husband associates less value with services provided by the ﬁrst (senior) wife and is equal to 1
2
if
the husband associates the same value with services provided by his wives, regardless of the order
of marriage. y is an exogenous income, and ρ(l1 + l2) is the total production of the children. ρ
represents the productivity of children (in terms of production per hour). l1 and l2 are the number
of hours of housework done by children of the ﬁrst and the second wife, respectively. Each wife is
responsible for choosing the number of hours her children work at home. The quantity ρ(l1 + l2)
is thus the endogenous production of children that the father transfers to his wives. One unit of a
wife's services to her husband is remunerated at ps. The price ps is exogenous.
Solving the Husband's Problem
The Lagrangian function associated with the father's problem can be written as :
L = Sγw1S
1−γ
w2 + λ (y + ρ(l1 + l2)− (psSw1 + psSw2)) .
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to Sw1 is:
∂L
∂Sw1
= γSγ−1w1 S
1−γ
w2 − λps = 0. (4)
And the ﬁrst order condition with respect to Sw2 is:
∂L
∂Sw2
= (1− γ)Sγw1S−γw2 − λps = 0. (5)
Finally, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to λ is:
psSw1 + psSw2 = y + ρ(l1 + l2) (6)
Using equations 4 and 5, we have:
Sw2 =
1− γ
γ
Sw1. (7)
Replacing equation 7 in equation 6 leads to
Sw1 =
γ
ps
(y + ρ(l1 + l2)) (8)
and
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Sw2 =
1− γ
ps
(y + ρ(l1 + l2)) . (9)
8.2 The Problem of the First (Senior) Wife
The representative ﬁrst wife receives her income from services that she provides to her husband.
She uses that income to pay for her children's consumption. Education is free, but children need
time to go to school to receive their education. Each child is endowed with one normalised unit of
time. In one part of their time, children go to school (1− l1). The remaining part of their time is
used for housework (l1). One hour of housework produces ρ. The total production of children of
the ﬁrst wife is redistributed to the whole family by the father.
The representative ﬁrst wife maximises her utility function by choosing the number of hours her
children work at home (l1) and her children's consumption (C1), subject to the budget constraint.
The problem of a representative ﬁrst wife is:
max
C1,l1
Cµ11 (1− l1)1−µ1
subject to the constraint:
pcC1 = psSw1 = γ (y + ρ(l1 + l2)) ,
where µ1 represents the geometric weight that the ﬁrst wife associates with the consumption of
her children.
Solving the First Wife's Problem
The Lagrangian function associated with the ﬁrst wife's problem can be written as:
L = Cµ11 (1− l1)1−µ1 + λ [γ (y + ρ(l1 + l2))− pcC1]
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to C1 is:
∂L
∂C1
= µ1C
µ1−1
1 (1− l1)1−µ1 − λpc = 0. (10)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to l1 is:
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∂L
∂l1
= −(1− µ1)Cµ11 (1− l1)−µ1 + λγρ = 0. (11)
And the ﬁrst order condition with respect to λ is:
pcC1 = γ (y + ρ(l1 + l2)) . (12)
Using equations 10 and 11 leads to:
pcC1 =
µ1γρ(1− l1)
1− µ1 . (13)
Using equation 13 and 12 leads to:
l1 = µ1 − 1− µ1
ρ
(y + ρl2) (14)
and
C1 =
γµ1
pc
(ρ+ y + ρl2) . (15)
8.3 The Problem of the Second (Junior) Wife
The second wife also receives her income from services provided to her husband. She also uses
that income to pay for her children's consumption. One part of the children's time is dedicated to
school (1− l2), and the remaining part (l2) is used for housework.
The representative second wife maximises her utility function by choosing the number of hours
her children work at home ( l2) and the consumption of her children (C2), subject to the budget
constraint. The problem of the representative second wife is:
max
C2,l2
Cµ22 (1− l2)1−µ2 ,
subject to the constraint:
pcC2 = psSw2 = (1− γ) (y + ρ(l1 + l2)) .
where µ2 represents the geometric weight that the second wife associates with the consumption of
her children.
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Solving the Second Wife's Problem
The Lagrangian function associated with the second wife's problem can be written as:
L = Cµ22 (1− l2)1−µ2 + λ [(1− γ) (y + ρ(l1 + l2))− pcC2] .
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to C2 is:
∂L
∂C2
= µ2C
µ2−1
2 (1− l2)1−µ2 − λpc = 0. (16)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to l2 is:
∂L
∂l2
= −(1− µ2)Cµ22 (1− l2)−µ2 + λ(1− γ)ρ = 0. (17)
And ﬁnally, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to λ is:
pcC2 = (1− γ) (y + ρ(l1 + l2)) . (18)
Using equations 16 and 17 leads to:
pcC2 =
µ2(1− γ)ρ(1− l2)
1− µ2 . (19)
Using equations 18 and 19 leads to:
l2 = µ2 − 1− µ2
ρ
(y + ρl1) (20)
and
C2 =
(1− γ)µ2
pc
(ρ+ y + ρl1) . (21)
8.4 The general solution
Theorem 1. The optimal choice of economic agents in our model is:
l1 =
µ1 − µ2(1− µ1)
µ1 + µ2(1− µ1) −
y
ρ
µ2(1− µ1)
µ1 + µ2(1− µ1) (22)
l2 =
µ2 − µ1(1− µ2)
µ2 + µ1(1− µ2) −
y
ρ
µ1(1− µ2)
µ2 + µ1(1− µ2) (23)
C1 =
γµ1µ2
pc [µ2 + µ1(1− µ2)] (2ρ+ y) (24)
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C2 =
(1− γ)µ1µ2
pc [µ1 + µ2(1− µ1)] (2ρ+ y) (25)
where l1 and l2 are the optimal number of hours of work done at home by children of the ﬁrst
and second wife, respectively. C1 and C2 are the optimal consumption for children of the ﬁrst and
second wife, respectively.
Proof. Using equation 14 and 20 leads to the following system of equations:l1 = µ1 −
1−µ1
ρ
(y + ρl2)
l2 = µ2 − 1−µ2ρ (y + ρl1)
with the solutions l1 =
µ1−µ2(1−µ1)
µ1+µ2(1−µ1) −
y
ρ
µ2(1−µ1)
µ1+µ2(1−µ1) and l2 =
µ2−µ1(1−µ2)
µ2+µ1(1−µ2) −
y
ρ
µ1(1−µ2)
µ2+µ1(1−µ2) .
By replacing 22 and 23 in 15 and 21, we obtain C1 =
γµ1µ2
pc[µ2+µ1(1−µ2)] (2ρ+ y) and C2 =
(1−γ)µ1µ2
pc[µ1+µ2(1−µ1)] (2ρ+ y) .
8.5 The Health and Education Index
8.5.1 The Health Index
The health indicator is assumed to be an increasing function of children's consumption. Malnu-
trition (including protein-energy malnutrition and micronutrient deﬁciencies) is the main cause of
diseases in developing countries (Müller & Krawinkel, 2005). Malnutrition increases susceptibility
to and severity of infections and therefore death from diseases (Murray & Lopez, 1997; Black, 2003;
Brabin & Coulter, 2003; Müller & Krawinkel, 2005; Silbersdorﬀ et al., 2018). Low income is one
of the causes of malnutrition (Sachs & McArthur, 2005) and has a causal relationship with health
(Backlund et al., 1996; Ettner, 1996; McDonough et al., 1997; Ecob & Smith, 1999; Marmot, 2002;
Case, 2004; Frijters et al., 2005; Lindahl, 2005; Kawachi et al., 2010; Kuehnle, 2014; Cesarini et
al., 2016; Haeck et al., 2018; Lebihan & Mao Takongmo, 2018).
For simplicity, the health indicator for child i can be written by assumption as:
Healthi =
Ci − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin +
ηi − ηmin
ηmax − ηmin , (26)
where Ci is the consumption of child i, Cmin is the minimum consumption and Cmax is the maximum
consumption. Ci−Cmin
Cmax−Cmin is such that the highest consumption by a child implies a value of 1, and
the lowest consumption implies a value of 0 (Lebihan et al., 2018; Todaro & Smith, 2015). ηi is an
error term and represents all factors other than consumption that can aﬀect the health condition.
Following Lebihan et al. (2018), ηmin is the worst negative shock that can aﬀect the child, and
ηmax is the best positive impact on health. As in Lebihan et al. (2018), we assume that ηi is a
realisation from the uniform distribution with the support [ηmin ηmax] = [−1 1]. If ηi < 0, the
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shock will negatively aﬀect health. If ηi > 0, health will be positively aﬀected by the shock. A
null shock will have no impact on health.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions presented in this model, the following results hold:
(a) If γ < 1
2
, then the consumption and the expected health index of children of the ﬁrst (senior)
wife will be lower than that of children of the second wife.
(b) If γ = 1
2
, then the consumption and the expected health index of children of the ﬁrst (senior)
wife will be equal to that of children of the second wife.
(c) If µ1 > µ2, then children of the ﬁrst (senior) wife will work more at home than children of
the second wife.
(d) If µ1 = µ2, all children will work the same number of hours regardless of the marriage order
of their mother.
Proof. Proof of (a) and (b) :
From equation 24 and 25 of the ﬁrst theorem, we have:
C1 =
γµ1µ2
pc [µ2 + µ1(1− µ2)] (2ρ+ y) and C2 =
(1− γ)µ1µ2
pc [µ1 + µ2(1− µ1)] (2ρ+ y) .
Then
C1 =
γ
1− γC2
γ
1−γ < 1 is equivalent to γ <
1
2
Thus, if γ < 1
2
then C1 < C2 and
C1 − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin <
C2 − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin i.e.
C1 − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin −
C2 − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin < 0
E (Health1) =
C1−Cmin
Cmax−Cmin + E
(
ηi−ηmin
ηmax−ηmin
)
and E (Health2) =
C2−Cmin
Cmax−Cmin + E
(
ηi−ηmin
ηmax−ηmin
)
,
Thus, if γ < 1
2
then
E (Health1)− E (Health2) = C1 − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin −
C2 − Cmin
Cmax − Cmin < 0.
Thus, if γ < 1
2
, then E (Health1) < E (Health2).
This result means that if the father associates less value with services provided by the ﬁrst
(senior) wife compared to services provided by the second (junior) wife (γ < 1
2
), our model predicts
that the consumption and the expected health conditions of children from the ﬁrst wife will both
be lower than that of children of the second wife.
On the other hand if γ = 1
2
, then C1 = C2 and E (Health1) = E (Health2) . This means that
if the father associates the same value with services provided by his wives, regardless of their
marriage order, children's consumption and expected health will be the same.
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Proof of (c) and (d) :
From equation 22 and 23 of the ﬁrst theorem, we have
l1 =
µ1 − µ2(1− µ1)
µ1 + µ2(1− µ1) −
y
ρ
µ2(1− µ1)
µ1 + µ2(1− µ1) and l2 =
µ2 − µ1(1− µ2)
µ2 + µ1(1− µ2) −
y
ρ
µ1(1− µ2)
µ2 + µ1(1− µ2) .
Then,
l1 − l2 = (µ1 − µ2) 2 + (y/ρ)
µ1 + µ2(1− µ1) . (27)
2+(y/ρ)
µ1+µ2(1−µ1) > 0 because y, ρ, µ1, µ2 are all positive, and µ1 and µ2 are less than 1.
Thus, if µ1 > µ2 then l1 > l2. In other words, if the ﬁrst wife associates more value with
consumption, her children will work more at home.
If µ1 = µ2 from equation 27, l1 = l2. If both the ﬁrst and the second wife associate the same
value with consumption, children will work the same number of hours at home, regardless of the
order of marriage of their mother.
8.5.2 The Education Index
The education indicator for child i is assumed to be positively correlated with time spent in school
(1− li) and with the child's eﬀort at school. As pointed out by Terrel Bell, a former Secretary of
Education of the United States, There are three things to remember about education. The ﬁrst is
motivation. The second is motivation. The third is motivation (Covington, 2000). The quality of
student learning and the will to continue learning also depend on motivation (Covington, 2000).
We assume that eﬀort expended at school by child i is negatively related to the share of income
his mother receives. It is well known that children who face discrimination are usually more
motivated and put in more eﬀort at school than their counterparts (Fuligni, 2001; Perreira et al.,
2010). Children who face discrimination view this eﬀort as their duty to their close parents, who
support them, in response to the sacriﬁces their parents make. They feel they must obtain better
jobs to help support their close parents in the future (Perreira et al., 2010).
Our education index is a weighted average of time spent at school and an indicator of the
child's eﬀort at school (represented by one minus the share of income received by his mother). It
is written as:
Educationi = φ
(1− li)− (1− lmax)
(1− lmin)− (1− lmax) + (1− φ)
(1− sharei)− (1− sharemax)
(1− sharemin)− (1− sharemax) +
vi − vmin
vmax − vmin
= φ
lmax − li
lmax − lmin + (1− φ)
sharemax − sharei
sharemax − sharemin +
vi − vmin
vmax − vmin (28)
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where (1 − li) represents the time spent at school, li represents time spent working at home,
lmin is the minimum number of hours spent working at home and lmax the maximum. sharei is
the share of income received by the mother of child i. sharemin and sharemax are the minimum
and the maximum share, respectively. By normalising, the unit becomes irrelevant and addition
becomes possible. vi represents any variable that may aﬀect the education of children other than
attendance and eﬀort. vmin is the worst negative shock and vmax the best positive impact on
schooling. For simplicity, vi will be a realisation from the uniform distribution with the support
[vmin vmax] = [−1 1]. φ ∈ (0 1) is the weight.
Note that lmin = 0 and sharemin = 0. Thus,
Educationi = φ(1− li) + (1− φ) (1− sharei) + vi − vmin
vmax − vmin . (29)
The share of income for the ﬁrst wife is γ. Thus, the education index for children of the ﬁrst
(senior) wife is:
EducationF istWivei = φ (1− l1) + (1− φ) (1− γ) + vi − vmin
vmax − vmin . (30)
The income share for the second (junior) wife is (1− γ). The education index for children of the
second wife is thus
EducationSecondWifei = φ (1− l2) + (1− φ)γ + vi − vmin
vmax − vmin . (31)
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions presented in this model, the following results hold:
(a) If both women associate the same value with consumption (i.e., µ1 = µ2 ), then:
- If additional to that the ﬁrst wife faces discrimination (i.e., γ < 1
2
), then children from
the ﬁrst (senior) wife will be expected to be better at school (i.e., E (EducationF istWivei) >
E (EducationSecondWifei)).
- If µ1 = µ2 and there is no discrimination between wives, children will be expected to have the
same education index.
(b) If there is no discrimination (i.e., γ = 1
2
), then:
- If additional to that, the ﬁrst wife associates less value with consumption (i.e., µ1 < µ2), then
children from the ﬁrst wife will be expected to perform better at school compared to children of the
second wife.
- If γ = 1
2
and all wives associate the same value with consumption, their children will be
expected to have the same level of education.
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Proof. The expected diﬀerence in education can be written as:
Ee1 − Ee2 = E (EducationF istWivei)− E (EducationSecondWifei)
Ee1 − Ee2 = φ (1− l1) + (1− φ) (1− γ)− [φ (1− l2) + (1− φ)γ]
= φ (l2 − l1) + (1− φ) (1− 2γ)
From equation 27 we have l1 − l2 = (µ1 − µ2) 2+(y/ρ)µ1+µ2(1−µ1) , thus
Ee1 − Ee2 = φ
[
(µ2 − µ1) 2 + (y/ρ)
µ1 + µ2(1− µ1)
]
+ (1− φ) (1− 2γ)
Proof of (a):
If µ1 = µ2 then Ee1 − Ee2 = (1 − φ) (1− 2γ) . If additional to that γ < 12 , then Ee1 > Ee2;
that is, E (EducationF istWivei) > E (EducationSecondWifei). In other words, children from
the ﬁrst (senior) wife will be expected to be better at school.
If µ1 = µ2 and there is no discrimination between wives ( i.e.γ = 12 ), then Ee1 − Ee2 =
φ
[
(µ2 − µ1) 2+(y/ρ)µ1+µ2(1−µ1)
]
+ (1− φ) (1− 2γ) = 0 and Ee1 = Ee2. That means that children will be
expected to have the same education index.
Proof of (b):
If γ = 1
2
, then Ee1 − Ee2 = φ
[
(µ2 − µ1) 2+(y/ρ)µ1+µ2(1−µ1)
]
.
Because 2+(y/ρ)
µ1+µ2(1−µ1) > 0, if γ =
1
2
and µ1 < µ2, then Ee1 > Ee2 . In this case, the model
thus implies that children from the ﬁrst (senior) wife will be expected to perform better at school
compared to children of the second wife.
If γ = 1
2
and all wives associate the same value with consumption (i.e., µ1 = µ2 ), then
Ee1−Ee2 = φ
[
(µ2 − µ1) 2+(y/ρ)µ1+µ2(1−µ1)
]
= 0, and Ee1 = Ee2. In other words, children will be expected
to have the same level of education, regardless of the order of marriage of their mother.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we use the DHS conducted in Mali to compare children in polygynous families
with children in monogamous families. We also analyse the link between the order of marriage of
mothers and their children's outcomes. Finally, we propose a theoretical model that rationalises
our ﬁndings. Our empirical analysis provides evidence that children in polygynous families are
less enrolled in school, progress less at school and do less domestic household work compared to
children from monogamous families. Evidence also shows that the school enrolment and progression
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of children of ﬁrst wives are higher compared to that of children of second and subsequent wives.
The weight-for-height and BMI are both lower for children of ﬁrst wives compared to children of
second and subsequent wives. Children of ﬁrst wives work more at home compared to children
of second and subsequent wives, but there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between them in terms of
time working outside the household. Our model predicts that when fathers discriminate against
ﬁrst wives, children of ﬁrst wives will, on average, perform better at school if eﬀort at school is
positively correlated with discrimination, will consume less and will have a lower health index
compared to children of second wives.
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Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics for the Control Variables
Variables Monogamous Polygyny First Wife Polygyny 2nd+ Wife
Household characteristics
HH head is male 0.941 0.957 0.964
Number of children 3.922 6.220 6.335
(1.757) (2.564) (2.832)
HH is located in Bamako 0.113 0.059 0.055
Child characteristics
Age of child 5.838 6.922 5.905
(4.081) (4.166) (4.049)
Child is male 0.511 0.518 0.526
Parental characteristics
Mother's age 31.030 34.364 32.057
(7.091) (6.566) (7.155)
Mother's education (years) 1.096 0.371 0.581
(2.878) (1.506) (2.064)
Father's education (years) 1.708 0.735 0.747
(3.964) (2.371) (2.540)
Muslim 0.909 0.936 0.949
Ethnic group : Bambara 0.336 0.363 0.335
N 14,218 (64.07 %) 3,829 (17.33 %) 4,017 (18.60 %)
Notes : This table displays the weighted summary statistics for children, mothers, fathers and families.
The statistics are presented by type of family. Standard deviations for continuous variables are in
parentheses.
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Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables
Variables Monogamous Polygyny First Wife Polygyny 2nd+ Wife
(64.07 %) (17.33 %) (18.60 %)
Child's Education
Enrolment 0.541 0.462 0.443
Progression 53.832 44.305 41.967
(60.917) (54.721) (54.640)
Child's Labour
Worked in domestic household 0.481 0.483 0.444
Worked for a family member 0.175 0.229 0.182
Worked for someone outside household 0.090 0.090 0.078
Child's Health
Weight/Height SD (WHO) -54.404 -62.985 -52.333
(134.833) (127.608) (139.810)
BMI SD (WHO) -39.415 -46.004 -36.108
(138.890) (132.853) (143.748)
N 14,218 (64.07 %) 3,829 (17.33 %) 4,017 (18.60 %)
Notes : This table displays the weighted summary statistics of dependent variables. The statistics are
presented by type of family. Standard deviations for continuous variables are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Child's Enrolment and Polygynous families
Sample: All
Enrolment Progression
Variables I II III IV
HH characteristics
Polygyny -0.088*** -0.031*** -10.612*** -4.147***
(0.011) (0.012) (1.403) (1.439)
HH head is male -0.058** -7.759**
(0.023) (3.297)
Number of children -0.004 0.359
(0.002) (0.291)
HH is located in Bamako 0.262*** 28.196***
(0.012) (2.035)
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.242*** -9.832***
(0.017) (3.454)
Age squared -0.011*** 0.386**
(0.001) (0.158)
Child is male 0.046*** 3.274**
(0.010) (1.349)
Parental characteristics
Mother's age -0.001 -0.016
(0.001) (0.112)
Mother's education (years) 0.015*** 1.931***
(0.002) (0.362)
Father's education (years) 0.027*** 3.932***
(0.001) (0.293)
Muslim -0.055*** -7.609***
(0.019) (2.428)
Ethnic group: Bambara 0.045*** 2.058
(0.011) (1.384)
Constant 0.541*** -0.633*** 53.832*** 110.221***
(0.007) (0.085) (0.970) (19.423)
Observations 11,311 11,311 9,500 9,500
R-squared 0.007 0.139 0.008 0.135
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Child's Health Indicators and Polygynous Families I
Sample: All
Weight/Height SD (WHO) BMI SD (WHO)
Variables I II III IV
HH characteristics
Polygyny -2.701 -7.173 -1.126 -7.615
(4.923) (5.757) (5.098) (5.937)
HH head is male -1.452 -2.918
(8.202) (8.374)
Number of children 2.216** 2.502**
(1.020) (1.067)
HH is located in Bamako -12.408* -18.000***
(6.656) (6.932)
Child characteristics
Age of child 18.883*** 43.776***
(5.754) (5.706)
Age squared -1.992 -7.176***
(1.229) (1.239)
Child is male -4.677 2.395
(4.612) (4.730)
Parental characteristics
Mother's age -0.170 -0.229
(0.346) (0.355)
Mother's education (years) 1.181 0.625
(1.050) (1.061)
Father's education (years) 0.963 0.333
(0.743) (0.765)
Muslim 0.232 2.015
(8.155) (8.437)
Ethnic group: Bambara -4.551 -5.317
(4.976) (5.082)
Constant -54.404*** -81.373*** -39.415*** -85.546***
(2.801) (14.662) (2.887) (15.036)
Observations 4,248 4,248 4,248 4,248
R-squared 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.032
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Children's Labour Indicators and Polygynous Families I
Sample: All
Domestic household Work for family Work outside the
work members household
Variables I II III IV V VI
HH characteristics
Polygyny -0.009 -0.023** 0.031*** 0.013 -0.006 -0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
HH head is male -0.030 0.073*** 0.007
(0.021) (0.014) (0.012)
Number of children -0.005** -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
HH is located in Bamako -0.055*** -0.116*** -0.023***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.126*** 0.069*** 0.024***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
Age squared -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Child is male -0.209*** 0.048*** -0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Parental characteristics
Mother's age -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother's education (secondary) -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Father's education (secondary) -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Muslim 0.005 -0.018 -0.015
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012)
Ethnic group: Bambara -0.010 0.017** 0.022***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant 0.476*** -0.054 0.175*** -0.308*** 0.090*** -0.064*
(0.006) (0.063) (0.005) (0.048) (0.004) (0.038)
Observations 12,915 12,915 12,915 12,915 12,915 12,915
R-squared 0.000 0.111 0.002 0.080 0.000 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Children's Enrolment, Children's Progression and Their Mother's Order of Marriage
Sample: All
Enrolment Progression
Variables I II III IV
HH characteristics
Polygyny: ﬁrst wife (Ref monogamous) -0.080*** -0.026* -9.528*** -2.779*
(0.013) (0.014) (1.672) (1.637)
Polygyny: 2nd+ wife -0.098*** -0.036** -11.865*** -5.738***
(0.014) (0.014) (1.800) (1.859)
HH head is male -0.058** -7.724**
(0.023) (3.297)
Number of children -0.004 0.365
(0.002) (0.291)
HH is located in Bamako 0.262*** 28.163***
(0.012) (2.035)
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.242*** -9.795***
(0.017) (3.453)
Age squared -0.011*** 0.383**
(0.001) (0.158)
Child is male 0.046*** 3.294**
(0.010) (1.349)
Parental characteristics
Mother's age -0.001 -0.021
(0.001) (0.112)
Mother's education (years) 0.015*** 1.941***
(0.002) (0.363)
Father's education (years) 0.027*** 3.930***
(0.001) (0.293)
Muslim -0.055*** -7.537***
(0.019) (2.431)
Ethnic group: Bambara 0.045*** 1.995
(0.011) (1.384)
Constant 0.541*** -0.633*** 53.832*** 110.195***
(0.007) (0.085) (0.970) (19.424)
Observations 11,311 11,311 9,500 9,500
R-squared 0.008 0.139 0.008 0.135
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Children's Health Indicators and Their Mother's Order of Marriage
Sample: All
Weight/Height SD (WHO) BMI SD (WHO)
Variables I II III IV
HH characteristics
Polygyny: ﬁrst wife (Ref monogamous) -8.580 -12.710* -6.588 -13.052*
(6.313) (6.833) (6.628) (7.126)
Polygyny: 2nd+ wife 2.071 -2.353 3.308 -2.882
(6.355) (7.158) (6.534) (7.322)
HH head is male -1.851 -3.309
(8.225) (8.400)
Number of kids 2.090** 2.378**
(1.023) (1.070)
HH is located in Bamako -12.229* -17.825**
(6.665) (6.942)
Child characteristics
Age of child 18.927*** 43.819***
(5.747) (5.700)
Age squared -1.994 -7.179***
(1.229) (1.239)
Child is male -4.677 2.395
(4.610) (4.728)
Parental characteristics
Mother's age -0.107 -0.168
(0.347) (0.357)
Mother's education (years) 1.142 0.587
(1.052) (1.063)
Father's education (years) 0.963 0.334
(0.741) (0.764)
Muslim 0.218 2.002
(8.158) (8.440)
Ethnic group: Bambara -4.383 -5.152
(4.969) (5.073)
Constant -54.404*** -82.418*** -39.415*** -86.572***
(2.801) (14.647) (2.888) (15.022)
Observations 4,248 4,248 4,248 4,248
R-squared 0.001 0.017 0.000 0.032
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Children's Labour and Their Mother's Order of Marriage
Sample: All
Domestic household Work for family Work outside the
work members household
Variables I II III IV V VI
HH characteristics
Polygyny: ﬁrst wife (Ref monogamous) 0.008 -0.015 0.054*** 0.027** -0.000 -0.005
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Polygyny: 2nd+ wife -0.027** -0.032** 0.007 -0.003 -0.013* -0.011
(0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
HH head is male -0.030 0.073*** 0.007
(0.021) (0.014) (0.012)
Number of children -0.005** -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
HH is located in Bamako -0.055*** -0.116*** -0.023***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.126*** 0.069*** 0.024***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
Age squared -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Child is male -0.209*** 0.048*** -0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Parental characteristics
Mother's age -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother's education (secondary) -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Father's education (secondary) -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Muslim 0.005 -0.018 -0.015
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012)
Ethnic group: Bambara -0.011 0.016** 0.022***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant 0.476*** -0.053 0.175*** -0.307*** 0.090*** -0.064*
(0.006) (0.063) (0.005) (0.048) (0.004) (0.038)
Observations 12,915 12,915 12,915 12,915 12,915 12,915
R-squared 0.001 0.111 0.003 0.081 0.000 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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